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I. INTRODUCTION

It must be a rare occurrence that a tax deduction for one and
the same expense is disallowed by two different courts in the
same year on two entirely different and unrelated theories, and
rarer still that both theories are wrong. But just that happened
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. My thanks to Professor
James Maule for his helpful comments and to my research assistant, Karen
Cross. Thanks also to New York Law School for its generous support.
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in the two 1995 decisions Stroud v. United Statesi in the district
court for the District of South Carolina and Hawronsky v.
Commissioner2 in the tax court. Three years later, yet a third
unrelated and erroneous theory was invoked to deny the same
deduction in Keane v. Commissioner,3 a 1998 Tax Court
Memorandum Decision, which fails to mention either Stroud or
Hawronsky. None of these decisions has been commented upon
in the tax literature, but both Stroud and Hawronsky are
routinely cited in reference works, with no hint of any suspicion
that they are wrongly decided.4
The deduction in question was for statutorily prescribed
treble damages-and trebled deemed interest-paid by
physicians whose medical education had been paid for by the
National Health Service Corps (NHSC) in exchange for a
contractual obligation to practice primary-care medicine at a site
in an underserved area designated by the NHSC. The service
obligation is for the greater of two years or one year for each
school year for which a scholarship was granted.s Physicians
who default on their service obligation are required by the
statutorily prescribed terms of the contract to pay damages in the
amount of triple the amount paid by the government plus triple
an amount of deemed interest calculated as if the scholarship
had been a loan at the highest prevailing rate.6
Congress established the NHSC in 1970 and its Scholarship
Program in 1976 for the purpose of alleviating the geographic
and specialty maldistribution of physicians and other health
practitioners in the United States.7 In order to assure the
provision of primary health services, scholarships are granted to
L 906 F. Supp. 990 (D.S.C. 1995).
2. 105 T.C. 94 (1995).
3. 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2046 (1998).
4. See, e.g., BORIS I. BITTKER, MARTIN J. McMAHON, AND LAWRENCE A.
ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS (3d ed. 2002).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2541 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 254o(b)(l)(a) (2000 & Supp. 2003).
7. See generally Lora C. Siegler, Annotation, Validity and Construction of
Provisions of National Health Service Corps Scholarship Program (42 USCS §§
2541 et seq.) with Respect to Proceedings Under 42 U.S.C.S. § 254o(b)(l)(A) for

Recovery of Treble Damages from Scholarship Recipients Failing to Fulfill
Obligations, 108 A.L.R. FED. 313, 319-23 (1992).
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physicians, dentists, nurses, physician assistants, and other
health professionals.a The scholarships provide both tuition and
fees for health care training, and also a monthly stipend for
living expenses.s During the years in question, the full amount
of such payments was exempt from tax. The NHSC program is
administered by the Public Health Service (PHS), an agency in
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
A scholarship recipient must sign a written contract obliging
himself to serve a post-training period of obligated service in an
area in which there is a shortage of health professionals.10 This
service is always remunerated, and in the case of physicians, it
may be satisfied by working directly for a governmental agency,
or more often by working in a private clinic, or even by
independent private practice, provided the location is approved
by the NHSC.n The terms and conditions of the contract
between the participant individual and the NHSC are statutorily
prescribed and always include a fixed formula for the treble
damages plus trebled interest for a participant's breach.12
An earlier version of the statute in effect from 1972 until
1977 required only single damages, that is, a return of the
government's money plus deemed interest, as many similar State
programs still do.13 The federal single-damages version was
repealed in 1976 and the current triple-damage provision went
into effect in 1977. The purpose of the new provision was
evidently to give the NHSC a stiff penalty to help enforce the

8. See 42 U.S.C. § 254l(a).
9. See generally Siegler, supra note 7, at 320.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 254l(b).
11. Siegler, supra note 7, at 320 ("The requirement is for service in the fulltime practice of the recipient's profession, as either a member of the NHSC or a
private practitioner, in an [Health Manpower Shortage Area] designated by the
Secretary of the Department of HHS.").
12. 42 U.S.C. § 254o(b). The applicable formula in the cases at issue was a
sum equal to three times the amounts actually paid by the government, plus
three times "the interest on such amounts which would be payable if at the time
the amounts were paid they were loans bearing interest at the maximum legal
prevailing rate, as determined by the Treasurer of the United States[,]"
multiplied by a fraction whose numerator is the months of unserved obligation
and whose denominator is total months of service obligation. Id.
13. Siegler, supra note 7, at 317-18.
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scholarship participants' service obligation, and the NHSC has
often used the threat of this penalty to coerce adherence to its
detailed regulations and procedures.
According to 42 U.S.C. § 254o(b)(l)(A), the treble damages
are due if the participant fails to begin or to complete his service
obligation "for any reason." The obligation of service or treble
damages may be waived pursuant to regulations delegated to the
HHS only if "compliance by the individual is impossible or would
involve extreme hardship to the individual and if enforcement of
such obligation with respect to any individual would be
unconscionable."14
The federal courts have decided more than three dozen
reported cases over the question whether the treble-damages
provision of the statutory contract is enforceable in a multitude
of factual circumstances and under a variety of legal theories, but
nearly all of the physicians who have resisted payment have
lost.15 The reported cases nearly always arise from the system by
which the NHSC assigns participants to locations for their tours
of service.16 The assignment process is left to the discretion of
the NHSC11 which determines, after consultation with state and
local authorities, which locations qualify for status as Health
Professional Shortage Areas (HPSA).1s
Then, the NHSC
annually prepares a list of available locations for which a
participant may apply, the HPSA Opportunity List (HPOL).
Only sites on the HPOL qualify for fulfillment of the service
obligation. The earlier a participant applies, the better the
choices. A participant who has not found a location by a certain
time will be assigned by the NHSC to any location it chooses. If

14. 42 U.S.C. § 254o(d)(2).
15. See generally Siegler, supra note 7, at 321-22.
16. There is considerable friction between participants and the NHSC. A
1990 study reported that 13% of participants had failed to complete their
service obligations and paid damages instead. Another 1992 study reported
considerable unhappiness among participants, many of whom felt they were
treated like "indentured servants." See generally Kristine Marietti Byrnes,
Note, Is there a Primary Care Doctor in the House? The Legislation Needed to
Address a National Shortage, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 799, 813 nn.68-69 (1994).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 254l(f)(l)(B)(iv).
18. Formerly "HMSA" for "Health Manpower Shortage Area."
4
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the NHSC declares a participant to be in default (because, for
example, he failed to obtain permission for deferral from the
NHSC in order to complete a residency, ·or because he was unable
to find a qualifying site),19 the NHSC will always forbear to
enforce the damages obligation if the participant will
acknowledge his default and liability for treble damages and
agree again to perform his service obligation by signing a
"forbearance agreement."20 But those in default go to the bottom
of the applicant list and have no choice as to where they will be
assigned. So they often default again, and eventually are forced
to pay.
The tax question is whether the treble damages payment is
deductible.
In Stroud, the district court held against the
taxpayer on the theory that, since the tuition and living stipend
had been tax-exempt, l.R.C. § 265(a)(l)21 barred any deduction
because the damages were expenses "allocable to" tax-exempt
income.22 A deduction for current interest on the taxpayer's
obligation to pay the treble damages was also denied.23
In Keane, the taxpayer's deduction of interest payments on a
promissory note for a reduced portion of the treble damages was
denied on the theory that the origin of the government's
compromised claim was a scholarship, and the interest was
therefore student loan interest, which is personal and
nondeductible under l.R.C. § 262 and l.R.C. § 163(h).24

19. Disputes ending in default often arise because the participant's
professional or personal situation may change during the five to eight years of
his medical education, making the service obligation unexpectedly burdensome.
For example, the participant may decide to specialize in a field which is
unacceptable to the NHSC, or his family situation may make it inconvenient or
impossible for him to serve at the site to which the NHSC assigns him. Very
often the participant in default does in fact serve the poor, but disagrees with
the HHSC as to whether the site of his practice does--or should-qualify as an
approved site.
20. See generally Siegler, supra note 7, at 350-359; United States v.
Redovan, 656 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Pa. 1986); United States v. Beane, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5776 (E.D. Pa. May 7, 1990).
21. 1.R.C. § 265(a)(l) (2000).
22. 906 F. Supp. at 993-94.
23. Id. at 996.
24. 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2046.
5
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In Hawronsky, the deduction was denied under the purported
authority of I.RC. § 162(f), on the theory that the damages were
in effect a "fine ... or similar penalt[y] paid to a Government for
the violation of any law."25 The errors in Hawronsky will be
treated in a companion article.
The thesis of this article is that both Stroud and Keane were
wrongly decided. The treble damages constituted a deductible
business expense of buying out the NHSC service obligation.
They were not incurred in order to obtain a tax-free scholarship
which had been received many years earlier, but rather for the
purpose of earning taxable income currently through medical
practice elsewhere. I.R.C. § 265(a)(l) simply does not apply to
these business damages. Current interest on the taxpayer's
obligation to pay the treble damages in the future are a business
expense for the same reason, and should be deductible unless
barred as unreimbursed employee business interest, an
argument which was not raised or discussed in either decision.
II. STROUD AND I.R.C. § 265(a)(l)
Dr. Nancy Stroud attended Tufts Medical School in
Massachusetts from 1978 to 1982 and her medical education was
paid for by an NHSC scholarship. Although Dr. Stroud was born,
raised, and schooled in Massachusetts and would have preferred
to remain there, she decided to perform her residency at the
Medical University of South Carolina because she was advised
that no positions for obstetricians were likely to become available
in Massachusetts for her to perform her service obligation under
the NHSC contract, but that such positions would be available in
South Carolina.
During the final year of her 1982-1986
residency, Dr. Stroud was in constant contact with the PHS to
discuss where she would perform her obligated service. It was at
this time that she discovered that there were no openings for her
specialty on the HPOL list for the entire state of South
Carolina-despite the lack of obstetricians in five counties and a
very high infant mortality rate.26

25. Hawronsky, 105 T.C. at 97.
26. Appellant's Brief at 5-9, Stroud v. United States, No. 95-3139, 1996 WL
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Dr. Stroud's husband had been a licensed real estate broker
in South Carolina since 1980. By the time Dr. Stroud learned
that the NHSC would not allow her to fulfill her service
obligation in South Carolina, her husband could not abandon the
real estate practice he had been building for six years, and she
was forced to give notice to the NHSC that she would "financially
fulfill" her service obligation. The NHSC placed her in default as
of July 1, 1986.27 Dr. Stroud did not have the funds to pay the
treble damages. After lengthy negotiations, she was allowed to
pay the liquidated damages, plus interest, in installments,
pursuant to a "Repayment Agreement" executed November 25,
1987.28 The Strouds made payments under that Agreement in
the years 1989, 1990, and 1991, and deducted both the principal
of the treble damages (except for the original scholarship
amount) and current interest on the note. The IRS invoked
I.RC. § 265(a)(l) to deny the deductions and claimed that the
treble damages and interest were allocable to tax-exempt
income-the exempt scholarship.
The Strouds paid the
deficiencies and then sued for a refund.
The government argued that the district court in Stroud
should disallow the deduction under the I.RC. § 162(£) theory of
Hawronsky, arguing that the damages were, in effect, a fine or
penalty.29 Although he was aware of the Hawronsky decision and
cited it,3o Judge Norton chose to consider only the I.RC. §
265(a)(l) theory and did not take the easier route of simply
following Hawronsky.
If the reason was that he saw the
weakness of the Hawronsky decision, he did not say so.
It should be noted that the two theories are not quite
equivalent in their effects because they may have contradictory
implications for other tax issues. One such issue was present in
Stroud-the deductibility of current interest paid on a
promissory note to pay the NHSC damages over time. If the
damages are a business expense, interest on them would be

477240 (4th Cir. Aug. 23, 1996).
27. Stroud, 906 F. Supp. at 991.
28. Id. at 991-92.
29. Id. at 993.
30. Id. at 994 n.8.
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deductible because the interest is not itself a penalty even if the
principal is. But if the damages are a cost of earning tax-free
income, presumably the interest is an additional cost of earning
tax-free income, and so not deductible.

A. Stroud aka GCM 39,336
In Stroud, the district court incautiously relied on the
government's General Counsel Memorandum (GCM) 39,336,31
which it found to be "clearly on point."32 The court first

31. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,336 (October 12, 1984).
32. 906 F. Supp. at 993. That it is "on point" is unsurprising, because this
GCM is the IRS's internal memorandum of law underlying the advice it gave in
a private letter ruling to another NHSC physician who was in precisely the
same circumstances.
GCM 39,336 begins by rejecting the correct proposal of the IRS Individual
Tax Division to analyze the damages in three parts: a repayment of the
scholarship itself, which would be nondeductible, and two deductible portions
consisting of a "penalty" portion and the "interest," which was how the
taxpayers in both Hawronsky and Stroud reported the damages.
Despite the inauspicious beginning, GCM 39,336 then quite logically
asserts that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to his scholarship, and that
the damages became due solely as a result of the taxpayer's subsequent breach
of the service agreement. The GCM then correctly states that the taxpayer
incurred no indebtedness to the government upon receipt of the scholarship,
and therefore no part of the damages constituted interest.
At this point GCM 39,336 maintains that although the amount of the
damages is calculated by reference to the amount of the scholarship received,
the "nexus" between the scholarship and the damages "is not substantial
enough" to apply the doctrine of United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678
(1969) (limiting taxpayer oil company's deduction for repayment of overcharges
to customers for natural gas to 72Y.% because taxpayer had already enjoyed
27Y.% depletion deduction when overcharges were received; denying double
benefit of exclusion and deduction for the same item). This assertion seems
erroneous because the taxpayer's compelled reimbursement of the original
untaxed scholarship (a component of the treble damages) appears perfectly
analogous to the Skelly Oil compelled reimbursement of (partially) untaxed oil
revenues.
Then GCM 39,336 acknowledges the general rule that a payment of
damages for breach of an employment contract is deductible, citing Rev. Rul.
67-48, 1967-1 C.B. 50 (holding deductible employee's payment of liquidated
damages pursuant to employment contract for failure to complete agreed period
of service after training because attributable to salary received).
Just when one expects the inevitable conclusion that the damages are
deductible in full because they are payable solely on account of the breach of

8
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considered and rejected the taxpayer's argument that Revenue
Ruling 67-4833 permitted the deduction. That ruling held that an
employee (coincidentally, a resident physician) could deduct an
amount paid to a former employer as liquidated damages for
breach of an employment contract by leaving before the end of
the agreed term of employment as a loss under I.R.C. §
165(c)(l).34
The court distinguished this ruling with two
observations: first, that the taxpayer in the instant litigation had
never been an employee of the government;35 and second, that
contract, GCM 39,336 abruptly reverses course and invokes I.R.C. § 265(a)(l) to
deny a deduction not just for the amount of the scholarship originally received,
but for the entire treble damages payment, on the ground that all the damages
are "directly allocable" to the tax-exempt scholarship. This breathtaking
conclusion is buttressed solely by Manocchio v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 989, 994
(1982), aff'd on other grounds, 710 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir. 1983), which is itself
erroneous and is criticized in detail below.
The author of the 1984 GCM 39,336 must have been aware of the abovecited appeal of Manocchio, which had been decided a year earlier, but he does
not cite it. As explained below in Part Il.2., however, the Ninth Circuit rejected
the tax court's reliance on I.R.C. § 265(a)(l) in Manocchio, and if the Ninth
Circuit was correct, all authority for basing the conclusion in GCM 39,336 on
I.R.C. § 265(a)(l) vanishes.
33. Rev. Rul. 67-48, 1967-1 C.B. 50.
34. The conclusion is correct, except that the deduction should have been
allowed under I.R.C. § 162 rather than I.R.C. § 165. A "loss" (when the term
refers to a particular item rather than to an overall loss) refers to a transaction
in property, not to a payment in cash, except in special circumstances not
relevant here, such as a "gambling loss" for which the tax term has been
imported from ordinary non-tax usage. See RICHARD. A. WESTIN, SHEPARD'S TAX
DICTIONARY (1993).
35. GCM 39,336 distinguishes Rev. Rul. 67-48 for a different reason-on
the ground that there the taxpayer's salary was taxable rather than taxexempt. However, a closer look leads to a different conclusion. The underlying
Rev. Rul. 67-48 is I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,328 (Sept. 7, 1966), from which
we learn that the first proposed version of the ruling would have divided the
liquidated damages into two parts: a reimbursement of excess salary which is
deductible, and a reimbursement of the cost of untaxed training, which is not.
The training program was for resident physicians who were offered a higher
initial salary if they agreed to remain as hospital staff for periods after their
training was completed. (Why the cost of training, if repaid as damages, should
not be deductible is not explained, and is anything but apparent. The repaid
expenses would seem to fit squarely within the deductible expenses for business
education allowed under Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5.) According to GCM 33,328, all
the damages in fact represented a return of salary and should therefore be
deductible. Nowhere, however, is there any suggestion that if some of the
damages had been a nondeductible return of the value of untaxed training, that

9
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the NHSC contract is governed by statutory standards rather
than contractual principles.36 The court failed to explain the
relevance of these observations, and their relevance is far from
obvious. In any event, the court then stated that because it
agreed with GCM 39,336 that the payments at issue are
nondeductible as allocable to tax-exempt income, it would decline
to decide whether the payments are otherwise deductible under
I.R.C. §§ 162 or 165.37
Having cleared away this obstacle, the court found the
question easy and the answer obvious. Were Dr. Stroud's treble
damages payments (the deductions) allocable to tax-exempt
income (the scholarship)? Clearly, yes. The nature of the taxexempt income is Dr. Stroud's scholarship; the relationship it
bears to the deductions is one of direct causation. "The payments
could hardly be more 'allocable' to the scholarship funds-they
would not be owed without a breach of the scholarship
agreement."38
The taxpayer argued that the damages payments were not
directly, but indirectly allocable to the scholarship, and that
therefore only a reasonable proportion should be deemed
nondeductible, citing subsection (c) of Treasury Regulations §
1.265-1:
Expenses and amounts otherwise allowable which are directly
allocable to any class or classes of exempt income shall be
allocated thereto; and expenses and amounts directly allocable
to any class or classes of nonexempt income shall be allocated
thereto. If an expense or amount otherwise allowable is
indirectly allocable to both a class of nonexempt income and a
class of exempt income, a reasonable proportion thereof
determined in the light of all the facts and circumstances in

this should result in denial of a deduction for the reimbursement of salary as
well. Just the reverse was suggested-it was assumed that a proper allocation
would be made, namely that the refund of salary would be deductible, and the
refund of untaxed training costs would not.
36. Stroud, 990 F. Supp. at 993 (citing United States v. Vanhorn, 20 F.3d
104 (4th Cir. 1994)).
37. Id. at 994.
38. Id.
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each case shall be allocated to each.39

The taxpayer contended that the payments at issue were
indirectly allocable to both nonexempt income (her taxable
income from private practice), and exempt income (the
scholarship funds), and sought to analogize her case to Induni v.
Commissioner. 40
The taxpayer in Induni was employed by the United States
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in Canada and
was entitled to receive a tax-exempt Living Quarters Allowance
(LQA) intended to pay his rent and utilities. Instead of renting,
the taxpayer bought a home and received a tax-free LQA equal to
10% of the purchase price of the home. The taxpayer sought to
deduct his mortgage interest and real property tax expenses
relating to his residence, but the tax court denied the deductions
to the extent that they were reimbursed by the tax-exempt LQA:
"In our view, petitioner's mortgage interest and real property
taxes are the housing expenses intended to be covered by the rent
component of the LQA. As such, the deductions are indirectly
allocable to a class of tax-exempt income within the meaning of
section 1.265-l(c)[.]"41
Judge Norton then stated that although the expenses for
which the taxpayer in Induni claimed a deduction were not
exactly the same expenses which the LQA was intended to cover,
they were nevertheless "indirectly" allocable to the exempt LQA
because they fit within the broader purpose of the LQA. Judge
Norton then concluded:
Here, this court need not make an analogy to find that the
Plaintiffs' payments are allocable to Dr. Stroud's scholarship ..
[T]he deductions are not indirectly allocable to the
scholarship, but directly allocable to it. Furthermore, because
the full amount of Plaintiffs' liability is directly allocable to the
tax-exempt scholarship, "the entire deduction is disallowed
without regard to the amount of exempt income actually

39. Treas. Reg. 1.265-l(c).
40. 98 T.C. 618 (1992), aff'd, 990 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1993) (disallowing home
mortgage interest and property tax deductions to the extent the taxpayer
received a tax-exempt government housing subsidy for living abroad).
41. 906 F. Supp. at 995 (quoting Induni, 98 T.C. at 623).

11

CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW

[Volume 1

received."42
Judge Norton's conclusions are based upon two related
errors, both borrowed from GCM 39,336. First, after admitting
that the damages are only due upon breach of the scholarship
agreement, he conflates the breach with the scholarship itself.
The breach is an independent business decision to buy out one
taxable employment obligation in favor of another which
occurred many years after the scholarship agreement was
made.43 Second, Judge Norton misunderstood the meaning of
"direct" and "indirect" allocations under the Regulations, which
refer to classes of income, not to items of income.
This
misreading was necessary in order to make it appear that I.RC.
§ 265(a)(l) applied in the first place. It did not. I.RC. § 265(a)(l)
applies to the costs of earning tax-exempt income, and the treble
damages are clearly not a cost of earning the scholarship; they
are a cost of the breach of the service agreement.
Going a little deeper, the Induni decision was irrelevant
because it was itself erroneously based upon I.RC. § 265(a)(l).
Housing expenses abroad are not a cost of earning the exempt
LQA; they are a cost of living and working abroad. Although the
result in Induni was correct, it should have been decided under
the principle of I.RC. § 111.44 What Stroud and Induni have in
common is that they represent opposite sides of a single problem:
double tax benefits for a single tax item. In Stroud the taxpayer
first received a tax-free item which she later repaid as an
otherwise deductible expense, just as in United States v. Skelly
Oil Co.,45 which should have governed the situation. In Induni,
the taxpayer first paid an otherwise deductible expense for which
he later received a tax-free reimbursement. In both cases a

42. Id. (citing GCM 39,336).
43. The issue of separating the scholarship from the breach will be
discussed in the last section of this Article concerning Keane and the origin of
the claim test.
44. I.R.C. § 111 (2000).
45. 394 U.S. 678 (1969) (limiting taxpayer oil company's deduction for
repayment of overcharges to customers for natural gas to 72Y.% because
taxpayer had already enjoyed 27Y.% depletion deduction when overcharges
were received; denying double benefit of exclusion and deduction for the same
item).

12

2006]

Deductibility of Treble Damages

double tax benefit should be avoided, but not by means of l.R.C. §
265(a)(l), which does not apply to problems of transactional
accounting such as these. In Induni the error was harmless
because the right result was reached despite the misapplication
of l.R.C. § 265(a)(l). In Stroud, however, the result was an
absurdly incorrect disallowance of the entire treble damages and
current interest, rather than the correct amount of the original
scholarship alone.
The illegitimate expansion of l.R.C. § 265(a)(l) into areas of
transactional accounting for which it was not designed has a long
and confusing history, but it aroused little or no opposition
because it apparently, but only apparently, led to correct results.
The courts did not parse the statute or Treasury Regulations
under l.R.C. § 265(a)(l) very carefully as long as the IRS's result
seemed correct, and by the time Stroud was decided, the
misapplication of l.R.C. § 265(a)(l) in this area was already
settled law. Without this prior body of erroneous doctrine, the
fatal mistake made in Stroud would have been impossible. In
order to appreciate how these errors came about, it is necessary
to review some history.
B. History of l.R.C. § 265(a)(l)
The original predecessor of current l.R.C. § 265(a)(l) was
enacted as section 24(a)(5) in the Revenue Act of 193446 in order
to disallow deductions for the production of tax-exempt income.
Such deductions would, in effect, shelter unrelated taxable
income and provide an unwarranted double tax benefit. The
specific situations Congress had before it when it enacted
(former) section 24(a)(5) were: (1) expenses incurred for the
purpose of producing exempt interest on state securities; (2)
exempt salaries received by state employees; and (3) exempt
income from leases of state school lands.47 The House version
would have disallowed all such expenses.
It is clear from the italicized words in the legislative history
below that the statutory language "allocable to," later to cause
46. Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-216, 48 Stat. 683, 691.
47. See generally id. at 683-84.
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great confusion, should be read as interchangeable with "paid or
incurred for the production of' tax-exempt income. The House
Report states:
Section 24(a)(5). Disallowance of deductions attributable
to tax-exempt income: This paragraph has been added to the
bill to eliminate as deductions from gross income expenses
allocable to the production of income wholly exempt from the
income tax. Under the present law interest on State securities,
salaries received by State employees, and income from leases of
State school lands are exempt from Federal income tax, but
expenses incurred in the production of such income are
allowable as deductions from gross income.48

The Senate version adds the express proviso that such
deductions are disallowed even if the tax exempt income fails to
materialize, and also limits the provision to tax-exempt income
other than interest, which was then dealt with in a separate
provision. The Senate Report states:
The House bill disallows amounts otherwise allowable as
deductions which are allocable to one or more classes of taxexempt income even though the income fails to materialize or
is received in an amount less than the expenditures made or
incurred.
For instance, under the present law, salaries
received by State employees, income from leases of State school
lands, and the interest on State and some classes of Federal
securities are exempt from the income tax. It is contended that
under the existing law all expenses incurred in the production
of such income are allowable as deductions. The House bill
specifically disallows expenses of this character. While your
committee is in general accord with the House provision, it is
not believed that this disallowance should be made to apply to
expenditures incurred in earning tax-exempt interest. To do so
might seriously interfere with the sale of Federal and State
securities .... 49

I.RC. § 265(a)(l) prohibits otherwise allowable deductions

48. ROBERT L. DOUGHTON, REVENUE ACT OF 1934, H.R. REP. No. 73-704
(1934), as reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 554, 571 (emphasis added).
49. PAT HARRISON, REVENUE BILL OF 1934, S. REP. No. 73-558 (1934), as
reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 586, 606 (emphasis added).
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for expenses which are allocable to classes of income (other than
interest) which are wholly exempt from tax. Until Stroud, the
provision had been applied-albeit in a haphazard manner-in
essentially two different types of situations. The first is that
which was originally contemplated by Congress when the
provision was enacted: disallowance of direct costs of earning taxexempt income. Here would belong, for example, disallowance of
deductions for legal fees in suits to acquire tax-exempt
inheritances, damages for personal injuries, or for state and
foreign income taxes imposed on items exempt from federal
income tax. If the expenses are incurred to earn a mixture of
taxable and tax-exempt income, they will be denied a deduction
in the same proportion that the tax-exempt income bears to total
income.5o
The second situation, and one of more recent provenance, is
the result of the IRS's efforts to extend the prohibition to disallow
expenses for deductible items for which the taxpayer has
arguably been paid reimbursement with tax-free grants in one
form or another. GCM 34,50651 ably recounts the history and
purpose of I.RC. § 265(a)(l), and concludes that Congress's
intent requires that the provision be applied in only two
situations: first, in the original situation in which the expense is
incurred for the purpose of earning tax-exempt income; and
second, where the taxpayer receives tax-exempt income which is
earmarked for a particular purpose, and the taxpayer incurs
expenses in carrying out that purpose.52 The GCM was only half
right: the second application is erroneous, and is the root of the
problem in Stroud.
1. Revenue Ruling 83-3 and Its Erroneous Reimbursement

Theory
The IRS first published its new "reimbursement" theory in
Revenue Ruling 83-3.53
It disallowed otherwise deductible

50.
51.
52.
53.

Treas. Reg. § 1.265-l(c).
l.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,506 (May 26, 1971).
Id. at 14-15.
Rev. Rul. 83-3, 1983-1 C.B. 72.
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educational expenses when the taxpayer received a tax-free
scholarship or tax-free veterans' educational benefit intended to
subsidize the same· studies,54 and disallowed home mortgage
interest and property deductions to the extent the taxpayer
received a parsonage housing allowance, which is tax exempt
under I.RC. § 107.55 Congress soon partially overruled the IRS
on the "reimbursement" theory in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 by
enacting I.RC. § 265(a)(6)(B)56 for the purpose of rescuing the
home mortgage and property tax deductions for parsons and
military personnel. A fascinating question involving fringe
benefits generally lurks in these disputes but is beyond the scope
of this article.57
54. The tax court decided in favor of the IRS on this issue as early as 1952
in Banks v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1386 (1952). After waffling back and forth,
the IRS's current position was not announced in a published ruling until Rev.
Rul. 83-3.
55. I.R.C. § 107 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
56. I.R.C. § 265(a)(6) provides that "[n]o deduction shall be denied under
this section for interest on a mortgage on, or real property taxes on, the home of
the taxpayer by reason of the receipt of an amount as-(A) a military housing
allowance, or (B) a parsonage allowance excludible from gross income under
section 107."
57. The IRS has also disallowed-under the "original" use of I.R.C. §
265(a)(l)-the reverends' trade or business deductions in proportion to the
amount their tax-free parsonage allowance bears to their total trade or business
income from the ministry, and this disallowance was approved by the tax court
in Deason v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 465 (1964), and more recently in Dalan v.
Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 370 (1988).
Very curiously, parsons seem to be the sole group which has been targeted
for both the "original" and the "reimbursement" kinds of disallowance under
I.R.C. § 265(a)(l).
However, the "original" application of I.RC. § 265(a)(l) seems impeccable
as applied to employee business expenses of all taxpayers who receive any taxfree fringe benefits. Employees do after all earn both taxable and tax-exempt
income from their business expenses. There is no apparent reason why the
Deason doctrine·should not disallow all taxpayers' trade or business deductions
in proportion to their receipt of all tax-exempt fringe benefits, not just the
parsonage allowance, including, for example, the quite similar exclusion for
employee housing provided for the benefit of the employer under I.R.C. § 119
(2000). If such benefits as medical and life insurance and educational subsidies
are included, the disallowance for many taxpayers might be very significant.
For example, if tax-free fringe benefits represented one quarter of the value of
an employee's total compensation, it should follow that one quarter of the
employee's otherwise deductible employee business expenses should be denied
under I.R.C. § 265(a)(l). Congress almost certainly did not intend this result. It
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Although the reimbursement cases have generally led to
reasonable results, the use of I.RC. § 265(a)(l) in such situations
stretches the meaning of "allocable to" beyond recognition and
can easily create confusion5s and error. The risk of error derives
from the fact that once an expense is found to be "allocable to"
tax-exempt income, a deduction must be denied in its entirety
even if it exceeds the amount of exempt income earned.59
This rule makes perfect sense if it is limited to the direct
costs of earning exempt income, and it has an exact parallel in
the rules which deny deductions for personal living expenses
altogether, whether or not the exempt consumption is actually
received. Similarly, business deductions are generally allowed in
full, whether or not the hoped-for business income is actually
realized. If the taxpayer does not have sufficient business
income for the year, the deductions are still allowable to offset
other income or as a carryforward. All three rules apply to
classes of income and expense, not to items.
The case of reimbursements is entirely different. If a
reimbursement is less than the otherwise deductible expense it
pays for, denial of the entire deduction is inappropriate. In fact,
the courts and the IRS seem to have understood this point,
because they have never applied an entire disallowance rule in
reimbursement cases. They arrive at the correct result, but
without seeing that it is impossible to base this result on I.R.C. §
265(a)(l).
Both the problem and its solution can be seen in two
decisions, Manocchio u. Commissioner,60 and Induni u.
is a glitch, and the Code should probably be amended to remove it.
58. Rev. Rul. 83-3 itself already displays confusion. The ruling lists four
reported authorities in which the new meaning of "allocable to" has purportedly
been applied to situations "where tax-exempt income is earmarked for a specific
purpose and deductions are incurred in carrying out that purpose." Rev. Rul.
83-3, 1983-1 C.B. 72, 73. Two of these, Heffelfinger v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 985
(1945), and Rev. Rul. 74-140, 1974-1 C.B. 50, disallowed deductions for. income
taxes, respectively foreign and state, which had been imposed on income which
was exempt from federal tax. This is an impeccable application of the core
original meaning of I.R.C. § 265(a)(l), not of the new reimbursement
application.
59. Treas. Reg.§ 1.265-l(b).
60. 78 T.C. 989 (1982), aff'd on other grounds, 710 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir.
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Commissioner. 61 In Manocchio, the issue was whether a pilot
who paid for a flight training course could deduct the full cost as
a business expense, even though the Veterans Administration
(VA) reimbursed the pilot for 90% of the cost and the
reimbursement was tax exempt. The tax court denied the
deduction to the extent it was reimbursed by the VA, under the
purported authority of I.RC. § 265(1).62 In doing so, the court
acknowledged that the legislative history of I.RC § 265(1)
indicated that Congress seemed principally concerned with
denying a deduction for the direct costs of earning exempt
income, rather than reimbursement situations like that in
Manocchio. The court further acknowledged that an alternative
analysis existed which would lead to the same conclusion: the
deduction should be denied simply because it was reimbursed;
the taxpayer did not pay the expense; the VA did.63 On appeal,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
on precisely this alternative rationale, and did not review the tax
court's construction of I.RC. § 265(1).64
The Ninth Circuit's analysis was correct for at least two
reasons. First, even if the reimbursement were taxable, the same
outcome was required, albeit by a slightly different path. The
deduction would be allowed but the taxable reimbursement
would restore 90% to income and result in a net deduction of 10%
of the flight training expense.65 Thus, it is the mere fact of
reimbursement which is decisive, not the fact that the
reimbursement is tax-exempt.66

1983).
61. 98 T.C. 618 (1992), aff'd 900 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1993).
62. Predecessor of I.R.C. § 265(a)(l), since renumbered.
63. 78 T.C. at 998.
64. 710 F.2d at 1402.
65. The tax court acknowledged that the taxpayer would be left in the
same tax situation if the reimbursement was taxable, but pointed out that this
need not always be the case. For example, a tax-exempt reimbursement is more
valuable than a taxable one if the taxpayer does not itemize and takes the
standard deduction instead. Manocchio, 78 T.C. at 996.
66. The Ninth Circuit's approach provides a principled explanation why
gift reimbursements do not trigger disallowance of otherwise allowable
deductions under I.R.C. § 265(a)(l). See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,506 (May
26, 1971). "There is ample evidence in the legislative history that the section
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Second, the direct route taken by the Ninth Circuit is clear
and simple. More importantly, it avoids the specter of denying
all the allocable expenses even if they exceed the amount of the
reimbursement.
In Manocchio, the tax court decided the
taxpayer's expense was "allocable to" the tax-exempt
reimbursement as if it were a cost of earning the reimbursement,
apparently because the taxpayer had to submit a receipt for his
expense. The tax court correctly permitted a deduction for the
remaining 10% of the costs actually paid but not reimbursed. It
is far from clear how the court arrived at this result, because it
decided the training expenses could be allocated to only one class
of income-the exempt reimbursement.67 If it had followed the
I.R.C. § 265(a)(l) analysis to its logical conclusion, it would have
been forced to deny the deduction in its entirety as "directly
allocable to" tax-exempt income.68 After all, the taxpayer was
required to pay 100% of the cost of flight training in order to
obtain the 90% reimbursement.
If the tax court had applied Treasury Reg. § 1.265-l(c) as
written, it would have been led to a very different, and wrong,
conclusion. That regulation prescribes that when an expense is
"indirectly allocable to both a class of nonexempt income and a
class of exempt income, a reasonable proportion thereof ... shall
be allocable to each."69 There is a class of nonexempt income to
which the expense is "indirectly" allocable-the pilot's taxable
salary. If the expense had not been so allocable, it would not
[265(a)] does not apply to disallow a deductible expense attributable to the
expenditure of a completely unrestricted gift." If one concentrates on whether
the taxpayer has paid the expense, it is clear the taxpayer has done so even
where the expense is paid by a family member because the economic effect is
the same as if the family member made an unrestricted gift to the taxpayer,
who then uses the gift to pay a deductible expense. This is no different from
paying deductible expenses out of the taxpayer's own tax-exempt interest from
municipal bonds. This economic-equivalence analysis cannot apply to thirdparty arms-length reimbursements such as scholarships, veterans' benefits,
housing allowances and the like, because such benefits are provided to subsidize
the targeted activity. There are no unrestricted scholarships payable regardless
of whether one enrolls in school, or a foreign housing allowance payable
whether or not one lives abroad.
67. Manocchio, 78 T.C. at 995.
68. Treas. Reg. § 1.265-l(b)-(c).
69. Treas. Reg. § 1.265- l(c).
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have been deductible as a business expense in the first place. It
follows from the Regulations that the flight training deduction
should have been denied in the same proportion that the
taxpayer's exempt reimbursement bears to the sum of his total
income-the pilot's taxable salary plus the reimbursement. The
reported facts in the Manocchio opinion provide only that
petitioner's training expenses were $4,162 in 1977, the
reimbursement was $3, 7 43, and the deficiency was $924. The
exact proportions cannot be calculated from these facts.
However, assuming the taxpayer's taxable salary was about
$30,000, it would follow that approximately 90% of the training
expense should be deductible as allocable to producing the
taxable income, and 10% denied as allocable to producing the
reimbursement, which is the exact reverse of what the tax court
correctly decided.
The Regulations under I.R.C. § 265(a)(l) simply do not work
in the Manocchio situation. One reason is that the terminology
"directly and indirectly allocable" is very confusing and poorly
chosen. Expenses which are allocated solely to one class of
income are termed "directly allocated" in Treas. Reg. § 1.265-l(c),
and those which are allocable partly to one class and partly to
another are called "indirectly allocable" to each class in some
proportion. For example, if a taxpayer recovers a personal injury
award of $1,000, of which $600 is taxable punitive damages and
$400 is tax-exempt, and incurs legal expenses of $100, $40 of the
expenses would be disallowed as "indirectly allocable" to a class
of tax-exempt income. But that $40 expense is allocable just as
"directly" (in normal English) to the $400 exempt income as it
would have been if the entire recovery had been exempt.
"Wholly'' and "partly'' allocable would have been much clearer
terms than "directly'' and "indirectly."
The terminology problem becomes even worse in Induni. 10
There, the taxpayer's home mortgage interest and property tax
payments, which were slightly in excess of his tax-exempt
housing subsidy, also had to be "allocated" for I.R.C. § 265(a)(l)
and Manocchio to apply. The tax court ostensibly made its

70. 98 T.C. 618.
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allocation under the same allocation Regulation § 1.265-l(c),
criticized above, but did not identify any class of taxable income
to which the mortgage interest and taxes might be allocable so as
to justify allowing a deduction for the 14.1 % of the expenses in
excess of the exempt LQA. The reason is, obviously, there is
none. Home mortgage interest and taxes are not expenses
incurred in order to produce income of any kind or class. n
Despite its garbled reading of§ 265(a)(l), however, the tax court
did manage to get the right answer.
In the final analysis, the tax court was not really applying
I.RC. § 265(a)(l) at all. It was applying the Ninth Circuit's
approach to Manocchio instead, and denying the deductions only
to the extent necessary to avoid an unjustified double tax benefit.
2. The Tax Benefit Rule and Revenue Ruling 83-3
It is not entirely clear why the IRS ever thought it needed to
invoke I.RC. § 265(a)(l) in the first place in Revenue Ruling 833, Manocchio, and Induni. The Ninth Circuit's approach to
Manocchio is fully capable of dealing with the "reimbursement"
line of cases. It is possible that the IRS did not believe it had a
clear statutory basis for denying the deductions offset by taxexempt reimbursements, or for denying the exempt status of
reimbursements which are statutorily excludible. I.RC. § 111
does not apply by its literal terms to the facts in Manocchio and
Induni because the expenses and reimbursements in those cases
both occurred in the same year. If the reimbursements had been
made in a later year, I.RC. § 111 would have been applicable,12
and the taxpayer would have taken the reimbursement into

71. See Treas. Reg. § l.861-8{e){9)(ii), l.861-8T(d)(2)(iii)(D) (as amended in
2005). Home mortgage interest and real property taxes are not definitely
related to any class or classes of gross income for the purpose of allocating and
apportioning expenses.
72. Section lll{a) provides: "Gross income does not include gross income
attributable to the recovery during the taxable year of any amount deducted in
any prior taxable year to the extent such amount did not reduce the amount of
tax imposed by this chapter." I.R.C. § lll(a) {2000). This statement of the
"exclusionary" side of the tax benefit rule implies that the recovery of an item
which was deducted in a prior year is taxable in the year of recovery of the prior
deduction.
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income to the extent of the prior deduction, assuming that the
reimbursement is a recovery or an event "fundamentally
inconsistent" with the deduction. 73 When both recovery and
deduction occur in the same year, the only correct result can be to
net them, as the tax court in effect did.
Also, a "recovery" for purposes of I.RC. § 111 is usually a
two-party affair in which the same party who originally received
the deductible item returns it, such as a refund of state taxes or
repayment of a debt which appeared worthless. It may be that
the IRS did not feel confident of success in three-party
transactions like Manocchio
and Induni where the
reimbursement comes from the government rather than from the
payee of the deductible expense.
C. The Error: I.RC.§ 265(a)(l) Does Not Apply at All
By now it should be clear that I.RC. § 265(a)(l) is both
literally and conceptually inapplicable to these "reimbursement"
situations, and is a fortiori inapplicable to Stroud. Like I.RC. §
111, it is intended to forestall double tax benefits, but there the
resemblance ends.
I.RC. § 265(a)(l) is designed to triage
expenses of producing income in the sense of gains or profits, but
the reimbursement situations do not involve profits. Pilots do
not take training courses in order to earn reimbursements, nor
do people live and work abroad to earn housing subsidies. Such
reimbursements may provide an incentive in the form of a
discount or rebate, but they are not pro.fit. By definition one
cannot earn a profit from a reimbursement. Literally and
etymologically, a reimbursement is a return or replacement of
funds which one had in the first place.
The language of the regulations under I.RC. § 265(a)(l)
simply cannot be made to fit the reimbursement situations, and
if the government had read its own regulations more carefully,
the error in Revenue Ruling 83-3 would never have arisen. The
73. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Comm'r, 460 U.S. 370 (1983) (holding
distribution of cattle feed in tax-free corporate liquidation in year after feed was
deducted is fundamentally inconsistent with prior deduction where
shareholders acquire basis in feed, and is a "recovery" within the meaning of
l.R.C. § 111).
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regulations speak consistently of allocating a proportion, not an
amount, of expenses to classes of exempt and non-exempt income.
A proportion necessarily refers to a percentage, or ratio, between
quantities. It does not and cannot refer to a simple comparison of
arithmetic amounts in absolute terms. But the "reimbursement"
situations, like I.RC. § 111 cases generally, always turn on
absolute amounts of addition and subtraction and never involve
proportions and percentages.
The erroneous "reimbursement" application of I.RC. §
265(a)(l) did no harm in Manocchio and Induni-largely because
I.RC. § 265(a)(l) was not really applied at all. But the further
extension of this mistaken theory in Stroud unfortunately did
produce the wrong result. In Stroud, the IRS inappropriately
used a proportional approach to a supposed reimbursement for
the first time, and the result was disastrous. Ultimately, the
error is due to the fact that I.RC. § 265(a)(l) is not applicable to
the situation in Stroud at all, either in its original or its
"reimbursement" form. Doctors obviously do not pay treble
damages in the current year in order to earn a tax-free
scholarship to medical school which was paid for half a dozen
years earlier. They pay current damages to be released from a
current onerous work obligation in order to buy freedom for other
career endeavors.
Nor does the fact pattern in Stroud resemble even slightly
the second, and illegitimate, "reimbursement" application of
I.RC. § 265(a)(l). The taxpayers' expenses in Manocchio and
Induni were properly denied as deductions because the
government, not the taxpayers, paid the expenses. But neither
the government nor anyone else reimbursed the taxpayer's triple
damages in Stroud. The taxpayer paid the full cost of the triple
damages herself. The only portion of the treble damages that
should be denied a deduction is the single-damages portion
representing the actual scholarship amount, under Skelly Oil, 74
just as the taxpayer reported on her tax return. All the
remaining amounts are deductible as business expenses under
the IRS's own Revenue Ruling 68-47.

74. 394 U.S. 678.
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The ultimate source of the error in Stroud was that the court
failed to see that the origin of the government's claim for
damages was not the original receipt of the scholarship, which
was long old and cold, but rather the taxpayer's breach of
contract.
A similar misperception of the origin of the
government's claim for damages caused the error in Keane,
discussed below in section III. In Keane, however, unlike m
Stroud, the origin of the claim test was invoked explicitly. 75
D. Origin of the Claim Test: What if There are Two Origins?
The leading case for the origin of the claim test is United
States v. Gilmore.76 The court in Gilmore held that the taxpayer
could not deduct attorney's fees in a divorce action as a business
or investment expense, even if his purpose was to protect his
income-producing properties, because although the effects of the
divorce would be felt in his profit-seeking activities, the claims
arose in the personal context of divorce. 77 The Gilmore doctrine
holds that a claim's personal or business character is to be
determined by its origin rather than its effects.
In Stroud, however, the issue had nothing to do with the
future effects of the interest or damages settlement. The issue in
Stroud was, rather, as between two possible origins in the past,
how far back does one go? Was the origin of the claim in the
original scholarship, or in the later breach?
For this question there is some authority, and it is firmly on
the side of going back only as far as the breach. Only three
months after Gilmore was decided, the tax court considered
whether attorney's fees for the collection of defaulted alimony
payments were deductible under I.R.C. § 212(1) in Elliott v.
Commissioner. 1s The Tax Court had no difficulty allowing the
deduction, and the IRS acquiesced. 79 Although the issue was not
discussed in Elliott, nor did the Elliot court even mention

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
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75 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2048-49.
372 U.S. 39 (1963).

Id.
40 T.C. 304 (1963), acq. in result, 1964-2 C.B. 3.
Id. (March 16, 1964).
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Gilmore, it seems fair to read the decision as holding that a
separate action for enforcement of collection of alimony long after
the divorce is old and cold is independent of the divorce, and has
its own origin in the breach of the obligation. The chain of origins
is cut off at that point, and Gilmore does not require reaching
further back to the more remote origin in the divorce.so
In another example, a business deduction for training
expenses was at issue in Hundley v. Commissioner.st Although
the issue in Hundley was not explicitly framed as involving the
origin· of the claim test, it could have just as easily been decided
under that theory. The taxpayer in Hundley was a high school
athlete whose father agreed to train him and act as his manager
and agent. The father periodically sacrificed other employment
to work with his son. They formally agreed that the son would
owe his father nothing for his services if he failed to obtain a
major-league contract. But if he succeeded, he would evenly split
any major-league signing bonus with his father. Two years later,
a major-league team signed the son and awarded a large bonus
payable over five years. The taxpayer divided the bonus with his
father as agreed and deducted the payment as a business
expense.s2
The IRS allowed only 10% of petitioner's deduction in
Hundley because the taxpayer was still in high school when
services were rendered, except for a two-week period when he
negotiated his professional contract.s3 The general rule for
educational expenses, as for job-seeking expenses, is that the
taxpayer must already be engaged in a trade or business in order
to be eligible to claim a deduction. Expenses to train for or seek a
first job are not deductible.84
The tax court held for the taxpayer, however, on the ground
80. But see Wild v. Comm'r, 42 T.C. 706 (1964). One year after Elliott, the
tax court extended the deductibility of attorney's fees to include negotiating a
right to alimony even as part of an ongoing divorce. This does not negate the
conclusion in the text, however. And in any case, the decision appears to be
wrongly decided for the reasons Judges Raum and Pierce give in their dissents.
81. 48 T.C. 339 (1967).
82. Id. at 340-44.
83. Id. at 344.
84. Id. (citing LR.C. § 162 (1954)).
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that the father's fee was not due or payable at all unless and
until the son actually entered the trade or business of
professional baseball-the son's obligation was contingent on
obtaining a major-league contract. Thus, the origin of the
obligation was in his trade or business, and his payment was a
cost of that business.85
In the NHSC situation, as in Hundley, the taxpayer received
educational and vocational services gratis, and tax exempt,
subject only to a contingent duty to pay if a future business
contingency arose. In both cases the contingency did materialize.
And in both cases the character of the expense, business uel non,
should be determined as of the time the contingent expense
became actual. If at that time the taxpayer is engaged in a trade
or business, and the payment is an expense of the business, the
expense should be allowed as a deduction.
If Hundley is correctly decided, Stroud represents an even
stronger case for allowing the deduction.
Both situations
involved tax-free professional training which would be paid for
only if a business-related contingency arose. In Hundley, the
contingency was both expected and desired by both parties. In
Stroud, the contingency of breach was neither desired nor
expected by either party at the time of contract.86 Thus, the case
for characterizing the damages in Stroud as relating to a current
substitution of one medical practice for another seems a fortiori
compelling. To relate it back to the remoter non-business origin
of the contingent obligation appears strained and unrealistic.
As Justice Jackson stated in his dissent in Lykes u. United
States,81 joined by Justice Frankfurter, it is the proximate cause
of an expense which matters:
A majority of my brethren seem to think they can escape
this conclusion by going further back in the chain of causation.
85. Id.

86. The treble damages are so high that no one would ever sign on the
NHSC program with the intention of dropping out and paying them. In Dr.
Stroud's case, the damages amounted to nearly six times the sum the
government actually advanced to her.
87. 343 U.S. 118 (1952) (holding that legal fees paid by donor in litigation
over amount of gift tax owed were not deductible, before 1954 enactment of
l.R.C. § 212(3)).
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They say the cause of this legal expense was the gift. Of course
one can reason, as my brethren do, that if there had been no
gifts there would have been no tax, if there had been no tax
there would have been no deficiency, if there were no deficiency
there would have been no contest, if there were no contest
there would have been no expense. And so the gifts caused the
expense. The fallacy of such logic is that it would be just as
possible to employ it to prove that the lawyer's fees were
caused by having children. If there had been no children there
would have been no gift, and if no gift no tax, and if no tax no
deficiency, and if no deficiency no contest, and if no contest no
expense. Hence, the lawyer's fee was not due to the contest at
all but was a part of the cost of having babies. If this reasoning
were presented by a taxpayer to avoid a tax, what would we
say of it? So treacherous is this kind of reasoning that in most
fields the law rests its conclusion only on proximate cause and
declines to follow the winding trail of remote and multiple
causations.SS

A very close analogy to Stroud lies in Private Letter Ruling
(PLR) 2001-27-022,s9 in which the taxpayer was a physician who
sold his practice. As part of the sales agreement, the selling
physician agreed to continue practicing with the buyer for a
period of time under a fee-splitting arrangement, during which
he would refer cases to the buyer, not compete with the buyer,
and not solicit former patients.9o
However, the taxpayer
breached the agreements by going back into practice on his own,
and was forced in arbitration to pay the buyer damages. The tax
question was whether the taxpayer was required to capitalize the
damages paid as part of the sales agreement, or whether the
damages could be deducted currently as expenses separate and
independent of the sales contract. The PLR correctly concluded
that the damages were deductible:
[E]ven though the first event in the fact pattern was the sale of

88. Id. at 128.
89. l.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-27-022 (April 4, 2001). Although the PLR
was decided long after Stroud and Keane, it does not purport to introduce any
change in the law and is fully consistent with what precedent did exist on the
question of alternative origins of a claim.
90. Id.
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Dr. A's medical practice, a capital transaction . . . . Dr. B did
not, for example, seek specific performance or rescission of the
asset purchase agreement.
The claims submitted to
arbitration arose from Dr. A's practice of medicine over two
years later and ... the ancillary agreements(.]91

This is a close parallel to Stroud. One need only substitute
the bar against deducting expenses of earning tax-exempt income
for the bar against deducting capital outlays. For example,
suppose a taxpayer accepts employment abroad, the income from
which is tax-exempt under I.R.C. § 911. As a condition of
employment, the taxpayer agrees to a restrictive covenant not to
divulge any confidential information or solicit any of his former
employer's clients and customers in the event he leaves to work
for competitor. If the taxpayer does return to the United States
and does work for a competitor, in breach of the restrictive
covenant, and is forced to pay damages to the first employer, it
seems beyond doubt that the damages would be deductible.
Under the same reasoning as PLR 2001-27-022, the damages
would be current expenses of the United States business, rather
than allocable to the earlier contract to earn tax-exempt income
abroad.

a

E. Capitalization Under the Indopco Regulations
The taxpayer in Stroud, as in nearly all the treble-damages
cases, effectively bought four years of freedom from her service
obligation. It would make perfect sense for the taxpayer to
capitalize the treble damages payment and amortize it over its
life term of four years, except that at the time Revenue Ruling
68-4 792 was in effect-and this ruling permitted an immediate
deduction.
In the meantime, however, the "Indopco
Regulations,"93 which govern whether certain intangibles must be
capitalized, became final as of December 1, 2003.94 These
91. Id.

92. 1967-1 C.B. 50 (holding employee's payment of liquidated damages,
pursuant to employment contract for failure to complete agreed period of service
after training, to be deductible).
93. Treas. Reg. § l.263(a)-4 to -5.
94. See Ethan Yale, The Final INDOPCO Regulations, 5 TAX NOTES 435
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regulations require capitalization of a payment made by a
taxpayer in order to terminate a contract providing the payee
with the exclusive right to acquire or use the taxpayer's property
or services.95 This regulation appears to apply to the Stroud
situation and to render Revenue Ruling 68-43 obsolete. The
Ruling, however, has not been revoked.
The Indopco Regulations generally do not purport to change
the cost recovery rules applicable to the intangibles which must
be capitalized. Thus, presumably a payment such as that in
Stroud would be amortized under I.RC. § 167(a) ratably over its
useful life of four years. This amortization, in turn, might
remove the deductions from the reach of I.RC. §§ 162(£) and
265(a)(l) for yet another reason: these provisions by their terms
apply to current deductions and have no explicit effect upon
amortization deductions allowable under I.RC.§ 167(a).
The Indopco Regulations were not on the horizon in 1995
when Hawronsky and Stroud were decided. On the other hand,
Indopco v. Commissioner was decided in 1992 and had already
laid down the dubious doctrines that capitalization is the general
rule for expenses which have future value, and that no
identifiable asset was necessary in order for capitalization to be
the proper treatment.96 Though the argument would have been
very creative at the time, the taxpayers in Hawronsky and
Stroud might well have argued, perhaps even successfully, that
the NHSC damages should be capitalized and amortized in light
of Indopco, and that the amortization deductions were arguably
outside the ambit of both I.RC. §§ 162(£) and 265(a)(l).
III. KEANE AND THE EMPLOYEE INTEREST DEDUCTION
In Keane v. Commissioner,97 the taxpayer was again a

(2004).
95. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(d)(7)(i)(B). Similarly, a taxpayer who buys his
way out of a noncompete agreement must capitalize the payment under Treas.
Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(d)(7)(iii), Example 3.
96. 503 U.S. 79 (1992) (holding that professional fees for friendly takeover
not currently deductible, and must be capitalized, because had future value and
no requirement of separate identifiable asset for capitalization rule to apply).
97. 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2046 (1998).
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physician who allegedly breached his NHSC service obligation.
The facts are not developed copiously, but it appears that the
NHSC permitted Dr. Keane a deferment of his service obligation
for one year in order to begin his internship and residency in
physical medicine and rehabilitation at Stanford University
Medical Center. After his first year at Stanford, the NHSC
refused to grant any further deferments based on "policy changes
in the program" which are not explained in the reported
decision.9s Dr. Keane remained to complete his residency at
Stanford despite the NHSC's refusal to grant a further
deferment. The NHSC declared Dr. Keane in default, and Dr.
Keane sued for a declaratory judgment of his rights in the
District Court for the District of Columbia.99 The NHSC appears
to have applied these policy changes retroactively, and the suit
was settled by compromise (essentially for single damages)
suggesting that the NHSC was less than certain of the strength
of its case for the full treble damages. Dr. Keane executed a
promissory note to pay $125,000 to the government, representing
$45,805 in original principal plus $79,195 in previously accrued
interest. Subsequent interest on the unpaid balance of these
sums was to accrue at the rate of 7.22%. The facts are not
spelled out in any detail, but it appears that the parties intended
these amounts to represent the original principal and deemed
interest without trebling.
The issue in Keane apparently concerned only the
deductibility of the post-settlement interest on the unpaid
balance of the promissory note. Indirectly, however, this raised
some of the very same issues as in Hawronsky and Stroud. If the
underlying principal of the promissory note, the compromised
damages, was deductible, or was even a nondeductible business
expense, the post-settlement interest on the note would be
deductible as well. Therefore, it became necessary once again to
determine whether the principal amount owed was a business
expense.

98. Id. at 2048.
99. Brief for Respondent at 6-7, Keane v. Comm'r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2046
(1998) (No. 23705-95).
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A. Nature of the Settlement
Special Trial Judge Dean correctly reasoned that to
determine the tax effect of a settlement one must look to the
underlying nature of the claim which was compromised.mo If the
underlying claim had a business origin, the interest on the
settlement would also have a business nature and would support
a deduction under I.RC.§ 162. Then, however, Judge Dean held
that the underlying dispute related to the NHSC scholarship and
the settlement represented repayment of that scholarship.
Because the scholarship was for medical training which had
qualified the taxpayer for a new and different profession, the
court said repayment of the scholarship was a nondeductible
personal expense under Treas. Reg. § l.162-5(a). It follows, the
court said, that the taxpayer's interest payments on the
promissory note are also nondeductible personal expenses-in
fact, interest on a student loan-rather than business expenses
under either I.RC. § 162 or I.RC. § 163. Without explanation,
the court declined the IRS's invitation to apply I.RC. § 265(a)(l)
to deny the interest deduction, and the opinion mentions neither
Hawronsky nor Stroud. Judge Dean's decision is curt and
conclusory and virtually devoid of explanation.
Judge Dean's analysis is utterly mistaken. It is true that
when the characterization of a settlement is specified by the
parties, that characterization will ordinarily be respected for tax
purposes. But that rule applies only to allocations between real
and actual claims. The government had no claim for recovery of
a student loan. The government's only real claim against the
taxpayer was for treble damages under 42 U.S.C. § 254o(b)(l).
The settlement agreement itself explicitly acknowledges this
legal basis, even if it misstates that interest had previously
accrued.
The Keane settlement recites that:
Dr. Keane shall pay ... ($45,805.00) in original principal (i.e.,
the monies expended on Dr. Keane's behalf for his medical
school tuition and expenses), plus previously accrued interest

100. Keane, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2046.
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totaling . . . ($79, 195.00) claimed by the Secretary under 42
U.S.C. Section 254o(b)(l)), plus additional interest on the
unpaid balance compounded at ... (7.22%) per annum ... .io1

The taxpayer incurred no indebtedness at the time of
entering into the scholarship contract. And the imputed interest
called for in the treble damages clause is not interest for tax
purposes, but is an element of damages to compensate the
government for its loss of the use of the money. It is wellestablished that, in the absence of actual indebtedness which is
presently enforceable, there can be no interest for tax purposes.
The rule applies to all types of contingent debt which may
become actual only after some intervening event. This rule
applies, for example, to "pre-judgment interest" which is an
element of damages but is not interest for tax purposes because
no valid and enforceable debt is created until judgment.102 The
IRS itself in its own GCM 39,336, which the tax court so heavily
relied upon in Stroud, explicitly acknowledges that the imputed
interest of the NHSC damages clause is not interest for tax
purposes because no indebtedness was created at the time of
making the contract, correctly citing Joseph W. Bettendorf 1da
The Keane settlement thus cannot be in lieu of repayment of
a scholarship loan plus student loan interest because the
government was not entitled to, and did not make, any such
claim. The settlement is, of course, in lieu of the treble damages.
And the tax treatment of the treble damages has been
established above in the treatment of Stroud; the original
scholarship amount is nondeductible under Skelly Oil, and the
imputed "interest" is an element of damages which is deductible
as a business expense.104

101. Id. at n.3.
102. See, e.g., Rozpad v. Comm'r, 154 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998); see generally
Alice G. Abreu, Distinguishing Interest from Damages: A Proposal for a New
Perspective, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 373 (1992).
103. 3 B.T.A. 378 (1926) (finding that damages for wrongful detention of
funds is not interest on indebtedness for tax purposes).
104. There is one possible loose end. The amount paid might have been
allocated for tax purposes in exact proportion to the amounts of the underlying
claims. In other words, the $46,000 of "principal" might have been treated as
one-third original principal and two-thirds trebled, or roughly $15,333 return of
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B. Employee Business Interest
The only issue in Keane was the deductibility of the current
interest paid on the settlement. Unfortunately, the proper
question to determine the issue was never even raised, much less
decided: whether the interest was employee business interest or
self-employed business interest. We have already determined
that the interest cannot be student interest on an educational
loan and that it must be business interest. However, that is not
the end of the question regarding the deductibility of the interest.
The identical question arose in Stroud because she did not pay
all of her damages at once, but entered into a repayment
agreement over time and paid interest on the promissory note.
The deductibility of this current interest was decided against the
taxpayer in Stroud, as in Keane. If the Stroud court was right in
denying a deduction for the damages under I.R.C. § 265(a)(l),
then denying the current interest deduction would also have been
correct because the current interest would have been
nondeductible as an additional cost "allocable to" the tax-exempt
scholarship, or because it would have fallen within the residual
category of non-deductible "personal" interest under I.RC. §
163(h)(l)(A).105 Note, however, that if the court had denied the
deduction of the damages under the Hawronsky theory that
I.RC. § 162(£) applied, the deduction for current interest would

scholarship and $30,667 trebled damages, and the $79,000 or "previously
accrued interest" might have been regarded as one-third imputed interest of
about $26,333, and the other two-thirds or the remaining $53,667 as the
trebling of the imputed interest. This would have had no other tax effect than
to reduce the non-deductible amount from $46,000 down to $15,333, with all the
balance remaining deductible. It would have had no tax effect upon the
deductibility of the current interest paid on these settlement amounts because
both types of principal are business payments (even though some portion was
not deductible). Given the language of the settlement agreement and the
apparent intention of the parties, it seems preferable to respect the settlement
allocation as written because the allocation is reasonable and both claims are
genuine. Also, it seems more in the spirit of Skelly Oil to forbid deduction of the
full scholarship amount received tax-free in order to avoid any amount of double
tax benefit.
105. Judge Norton's opinion on this point is so cryptic and confusing that it
is not entirely clear why he denied the deduction for current interest. See 906
F. Supp. at 995.
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have been allowable. Interest on a penalty is not itself a penalty,
and because I.RC. § 162(£) applies only to otherwise deductible
business expenses, interest on the disallowed damages would
have been deductible trade or business interest, at least on the
assumption that Hawronsky was self-employed.
Employment status is the wrinkle. After the 1986 Act,
business interest incurred by an employee is not deductible at all.
This interest is now termed "personal" and is therefore
nondeductible under the rather clumsy language of I.R.C. §
163(h)(l) and (2)(a).106 Legislative history is apparently nonexistent for this absurdly harsh rule. Most other unreimbursed
employee business expenses are cut down by the 2% floor of
I.R.C. § 67, which is itself largely unjustified; but at least the
deductions are allowed in some part if they are substantial. By
contrast, and inexplicably, employee business interest is not
deductible at all. It may be that the drafters of this rule thought
that an occasional business interest expense of an employee was
likely to be limited to de minimis amounts on a credit card, or
that if the interest expense were legitimately for business, the
employer would have reimbursed the expense. If the rule rests
upon either of these assumptions, the drafters were sorely
mistaken, as can be seen in McKay u. Commissioner.101
In McKay, the taxpayer's interest expense of some $44,000 on
a loan to pay his legal fees was denied, even though some
amounts were paid while the taxpayer was self-employed, on the
ground that the taxpayer's litigation grew out of his earlier
employment.10s The taxpayer's suit was against his former
employer for wrongful discharge and related causes of action.
Thus, the rule of McKay seems to be that it is the purpose of the
borrowing which determines whether business expense is
disallowed as employee interest,109 and not the employment
status of the taxpayer at the time of payment or even at the time
106. "[T]he term 'personal interest' means any interest ... other than - (A)
interest ... allocable to a trade or business (other than the trade or business of
providing services as an employee) ...." I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(A) (2000).
107. 102 T.C. 465 (1994).
108. Id.
109. The facts indicate that the taxpayer was discharged in 1983, but did
not begin his lawsuit or his borrowings until a year later. 48 T.C. at 14, 36.
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of borrowing .110
Thus, whether the current interest was deductible on the
taxpayers' obligations in both Stroud and Keane would appear to
depend exclusively on the taxpayers' purpose for incurring the
obligation. If the taxpayer signed the note to buy her freedom to
practice, or to continue practicing, medicine as an employee, the
interest, whenever paid (apparently even if paid after later
switching to self-employment) would be entirely non-deductible
as employee business interest. If the taxpayer signed the note to
practice, or continue practicing, medicine while self-employed,
the interest would be deductible in full when paid. This slightly
absurd question was--or should have been-the only relevant
question regarding deductibility of the interest. But the question
was never raised, much less briefed, in either Stroud or Keane.m
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit blindly affirmed the district court's
misapplication of I.R.C. § 265(a)(l) in Stroud, and approved the
district court's conclusion that the current interest on the note
was personal as well.112 But the Fourth Circuit did reverse the
complete denial of the interest deduction and allowed a partial
deduction for the years 1989 and 1990-years when the personal
interest deduction was still being phased out.
IV. CONCLUSION
The lessons to be learned from these erroneous decisions are
not limited to uncovering and understanding the mistakes
lawyers and the courts committed in Stroud and Keane, nor to
recognizing the threat that the IRS will continue to unreasonably
extend its arsenal of disallowance provisions under I.R.C. §§
110. This is in accordance with Treas. Reg. § l.163-8T(c), which asserts that
debt is to be allocated (as business, personal or otherwise) in accordance with
the use of the loan proceeds, and that if there are no loan proceeds (as in the
NHSC obligations), then allocated as if there were proceeds; i.e. as if used for
whatever purpose the obligation were incurred. Treas. Reg. § l.163-8T(c)(3)(ii).
Interest paid is to be allocated in the same manner as the principal, regardless
of when the interest is paid. Treas. Reg. § l.163-8T(c)(2)(ii).
111. Not enough facts were recited in either reported decision to make it
clear what the outcome should have been.
112. Stroud v. United States, No. 95-3139, 1996 WL 477240 (4th Cir. Aug.
23, 1996).
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162(£), 265(a)(l), and 163(h) into new and unpredictable reaches.
The most significant danger is that the IRS seems increasingly
aggressive and unreasonable in its interpretations of law, and
the courts seem uncritically deferential to the government. If the
IRS is outgunned by big business, as is often asserted, it seems
equally true that the IRS in turn outguns relatively defenseless
taxpayers with whom the mainstream business tax bar is largely
unconcerned.
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